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EDITORIAL NOTES
WAIVER OF TRIAL BY JURY; A FURTHER COMMENT
The local law dealing with this subject has already been re-
viewed by the writer in a former issue of this publication,' where
an attempt has been made to analyze the constitutional provisions,
the statutes and the decisions prescribing the method and limiting
the conditions under which a valid waiver of trial by jury may be
made. The present discussion is prompted by a recent decision2
which has finally placed definite emphasis on an element in the
situation which, although alluded to in a prior case, has generally
been ignored. What is said here will apply only to actions in-
' Note (1927) 33 W. VA. L. Q. 183.
2 Matheny v. Greider, 177 S. E. 769 (W. Va. 1934).
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stituted in a court of record, and not to actions tried do inovo on
appeal or to cases tried before a justice of the peace, which are
controlled-by different statutory regulations. For purposes of a
background, some repetition will be necessary; but the reader is
referred to the former discussion for a more comprehensive state-
ment of the various distinctions and arguments involved.
The specific question involved in the present discussion is
this: When may a plaintiff, alone, without participation by the
defendant, waive a trial by jury? The problem involved in answer-
ing this question, as presented by the decisions, is whether this
power of the plaintiff to waive depends (1) upon the fact that
the defendant has failed to demand a jury trial, or (2) upon the
fact that, in the language of the statute,3 "the defendant has failed
to appear"; and, further, if the defendant's failure to appear is
the condition upon which the plaintiff's power to waive depends,
whether this means (a) failure to appear to the action, or rather
(b) ifailure to appear personally in court when the case is called
for trial. Since the right to a jury trial is regulated both by the
Constitution and by statute, a solution of the problem involved
will require consideration of both regulatory sources. The pro-
vision in the Constitution is as follows:
"In suits at common law, where the value in controversy
exceeds twenty dollars, exclusive of interest and costs, the
right of trial by jury, if required by either party, shall be
preserved."'
It will be noted that this provision does not impose a trial by
jury upon either party. It merely preserves the right, and this only
upon the condition that the right shall be required (demanded)
by one of the parties. Unlike the statute, it does not deal with
waiver, because, so far as the Constitution is concerned, there is
'a "The court in an action at law, if neither party require a jury, or if
the defendant has failed to appear and the plaintiff do not require a jury,
shall ascertain the amount the plaintiff is entitled to recover in the action,
if any, and render judgment accordingly. In any case, except a case of
felony, in which a trial by jury would be otherwise proper, the parties or
their counsel, by consent entered of record, may waive the right to have a
jury, and thereupon the whole matter of law and fact shall be heard and
determined, and judgment given by the court .... ". W. VA. REv. CODE
(1931) c. 56, art. 6, § 11.
This section is a combination of two sections appearing in the former Code.
The terms appear to be somewhat contradictory in their purport, but the two
former sections were construed together in Salzer v. Schwartz, infra .n. 7,
as requiring a waiver to be by consent entered of record and there is nothing
resulting from the present combination which would justify a different con-
struction.
4W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 13. The italics have been supplied.
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no right which could be the subject of a waiver unless a demand
be made. Logically, any repudiation of the right that might come
after a demand had been made would rather be in the nature of
a retraction of the demand, than of a waiver of the right. If no
demand for a jury is made, the provision leaves the status of jury
trial precisely as established by the common law, and so subject
to unlimited legislative regulation. Hence, in the absence of a de-
mand, a statute might dispense absolutely with a jury trial or
provide for any variety of waiver of the right. And even if a
demand is made, this would not preclude any statutory regulation
which would still preserve the right. Wherefore, a statute might
provide absolutely that there must be a trial by jury in all cases.
The effect of the applicable statute is that there must be a trial
by jury unless the right is affirmatively waived. Furthermore, the
waiver must appear by "consent entered of record.' ' No demand
is necessary. So far as demand is concerned, the statute itself, in
effect, interposes a demand on behalf of both parties except in the
case of a defendant who "has failed to appear". If the defendant
has "appeared", both parties must waive; but "if the defendant
has failed to appear", the plaintiff may waive.
As a consequence of the constitutional and statutory pro-
visions, it will be noted, there are two situations under either of
which the plaintiff acting alone would be unable to waive a jury
trial. (1) If the defendant has demanded a jury, the Constitution
prevents a waiver by the plaintiff, regardless of what any statute
might provide. (2) If the defendant has "appeared", under the
statute, regardless of whether he has demanded a jury, he is re-
quired to participate in the waiver.
In all cases where the defendant has "appeared", it would
seem superfluous, as long as the statute continues in its present
purport, to inquire whether he has made a demand for a trial by
jury. Regardless of a demand, the statute requires a trial by jury
until the right is repudiated by waiver. Consequently, the decisions
have been primarily concerned, not with the question whether a
proper demand has been made, but with the essentials and
prerequisites of waiver ;6 and particularly, where the plaintiff act-
ing alone has attempted to waive, with the meaning of the phrase,
"if the defendant has failed to appear".
In the first case7 in which this phrase was construed, the
5 Note (1927) 33 W. VA. L. Q. 185-186.
a Idem.
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defendant had appeared and, among other things, had pleaded
the general issue. Later, when the case was called for trial, he
failed to appear in the court room. The plaintiff, assuming that
the defendant had "failed to appear" within the meaning of the
statute, waived a jury and submitted his case to the court. A
judgment for the plaintiff was reversed, the Supreme Court hold-
ing that the phrase means failure to appear to the action, and
not merely failure to appear in court when the case is called for
trial. The court emphasizes the fact that the defendant had
pleaded the general issue and had "put himself upon the country,"
apparently denying the plaintiff's power to waive on the ground
that the defendant had thus demanded a jury and so had called
into operation the provision in the Constitution. On the other hand,
allusion is made to the fact that the defendant, by pleading the
general issue and other matters, had appeared and so, supposedly,
had called into operation the terms of the statute which required
his participation in the waiver. Wherefore, it is not clear what
is intended to be the fundamental basis of the decision-whether
demand, in terms of the Constitution or under some supposed
requirement of the statute, or appearance, under the literal
language of the statute. In the second case" decided, the general
issue was also pleaded and the first case is cited as a precedent.
Appearance by the defendant and the joinder of issue are referred
to as the circumstances which prevented the plaintiff from making
a waiver.
The third and final case9 decided, citing the two earlier
cases as precedents, definitely bases the inhibition on the plaintiff's
power to waive upon assumption that the defendant, by pleading
the general issue, had demanded a jury.
"The filing of a plea of the general issue is tantamount
to demanding trial of the action by jury."
In this case, again, it is not clear whether the court considers
the demand as an operative element responding to the condition
in the Constitution, or as a consequence that must result from
appearance under the statute, but apparently the former.
Which of these two theories is correct ? Are the two, in appli-
cation, concurrent in effect, so that it is immaterial which one is
applied, or will one solve problems involved in situations to which
the other will not adequately respond?
7 Salzer v. Schwartz, 88 W. Va. 569, 107 S. E. 298 (1921).
8 Shamblin v. Hall, 100 W. Va. 375, 130 S. E. 496 (1925).
9 Matheny v. Greider, .supra n. 2.
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It may first be inquired whether it is necessary at all, in
order to preserve the defendant's right, to resort to any theory
to the effect that by filing a plea he has demanded a jury trial.
Under the statute, the very fact that he has appeared precludes a
waiver without his consent. It may very well be argued that the
statute intends a general appearance-an appearance to the merits
-although this is not demanded by its literal terms. But if it
means something else or something more than at the least a general
appearance, e. g., a demand, then why does it not say so? It would
have been just as easy to say "if the defendant fail to demand a
trial by jury", and thus avoid all ambiguity, as to say "if the
defendant fail to appear." To make the two phrases mean the
same thing certainly places a heavy task on any process of in-
ference. If the statute means anything, as construed in Salzer v.
Schwartz, ° it must apply at the least to any case in which the
defendant pleads in bar, regardless of the conclusion of his plea.
If so, then, under the statute, he must participate in the waiver,
whether, under the Constitution, he has demanded a jury trial or
not; and there is no necessity, in ordering to give operative effect
to the statute, to translate appearance into terms of demand.
However, under Mat7teny v. Greider," it is not the mere fact
that the defendant pleaded in bar that receives emphasis, but also
the fact that he pleaded the general issue and so "put himself
upon the country", thus, supposedly, demanding a jury trial. As-
suming, as seems the more logical. conclusion, that the court looks
upon this supposed demand as an affirmative, if not express,
demand, it may be inferred that its effect is intended to arise
from the provision in the Constitution rather than from the
terms of the statute. Is it logical to conclude that the Constitution
contemplates any such mechanism as a method of expressing the
demand?
The function of the conclusion to a traverse, so far as it might
be interpreted as a conscious demand for a trial by jury, has under-
gone great change in the course of history. This formal con-
clusion developed in days when the older methods of trial (by
ordeal or by battle) were still more or less concurrent with trial
by jury. Hence it served not only to differentiate a traverse from
a special plea, but also to select the method of trial. When the
older methods of trial became obsolete and the jury trial remained
as the one common-law method of trial, the remaining practical
significance of the conclusion was that it served, symbolically, to
10 Supra n. 7.
-i Supra 3. 2.
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distinguish a traverse from a special plea. Hence, in the modern
law, a conclusion to the country or with a verification is generally
(and always ought to be) considered a mere formal allegation,
since the court (as the pleader must do before he knows what
kind of conclusion to add) can determine from the subject matter
of the pleading whether it is a traverse or a special pleading.2 In
these days, and particularly under the West Virginia statute,
when a defendant traverses, it is not necessary for him to demand
a jury trial. A jury trial is the only mode of trial which the
common law has to offer him and the statute compels him to take it
unless he waives it by consent entered of record if he has appeared.
If his plea concludes to the country, it is because the nature of
his plea formally demands that sort of conclusion. It is safe to say
that, when either party adds the formal conclusion to a traverse,
neither he nor his counsel will have any conscious idea that he is
so demanding a trial by jury. What the pleader is consciously
attempting to do is to plead to an issue so that the case may be
tried. The method of trial, if it is thought of at all, is looked upon
as something to come in the future and as something associated
with trial practice and procedure, rather than with the formalities
of pleading. In fact, the issues must be made up (which usually
involves pleading the general issue) before the court can try a case
in lieu of a jury, 8 and the plea will be present with its conclusion
to the country, in spite of the fact that the parties may have
known all along that a trial by jury would be waived.
In the cases adjudicated at this time, it would perhaps make
no practical difference which theory is applied. The same results
would be reached under either. But other situations may present
problems not subject to alternative solutions. For instance, sup-
pose that the defendant relies solely upon a special plea, which, of
course, would not conclude to the country; that the plaintiff, by
replication, traverses the plea, concluding to the country; that
the defendant fails, as he may do under the statute,14 to add a
sirmatter putting himself likewise upon the country; and that the
defendant is not present when the case is called for trial. Can the
plaintiff under these circumstances waive a trial by jury? Accord-
ing to the test propounded in Matheny v. Greider,8 yes, because
the defendant has not put himself upon the country; according
12 Carlin, Common Law Pleas and 1 vubsequest Pleadings in West Virginia
(1931) 38 W. VA. L. Q. 17.
1 Western Maryland By. Co. v. Cross, 92 W. Va. 9, 114 S. E. 438 (1922).
14 W. VA. Rnv. CODE, c. 56, art. 4, § 44.
15 Supra n. 2.
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to the words of the statute, no, because the defendant has appeared
by pleading his special plea in bar, and therefore must participate
in the waiver. The fact that the defendant is absent from the
court room when he must know that his case will be called for trial
would seem to indicate that he cares little about the case, and per-
haps less about the mode of trial; a consideration which has always
caused the writer to wonder whether the construction of the
statute insisted upon by the plaintiff in Salzer v. Schwartzl was
not the correct one. However, siice the court in the latter case
has decided that the defendant's absence from the court room at
the time of trial has no significance, and that his failure to appear
to the action is the real consideration, is there any practical reason
why a trial by jury should be any less sacred or expedient for the
defendant when the issue to be decided is the truth of the de-
fendant's plea, than when the matter to be tried is the truth of
the plaintiff's declaration?
The doctrine announced in Matheny v. Greider may carry
embarrassing implications for those who might undertake to
modify the present statute regulating the right to trial by jury.
In many jurisdictions, neither under constitutions nor under
statutes is a party entitled to a trial by jury unless the right is
demanded. Such a limitation upon the right seems to have received
the sanction of a majority of those interested in the reform of
trial practice. Yet if a plea of the general issue constitutes a de-
mand for a trial by jury, in most cases (since the general issue
is usually pleaded), if the defendant should participate in the
trial, it would be necessary, in spite of the statutory limitation, in
order to conform to the requirement of the Constitution, to resort
to some sort of waiver or retraction of the demand made by the
plea, and so the purpose of the statute would be defeated. If the
defendant should not be present at the trial, so as expressly or
impliedly to retract the demand made by his plea, then the plain-
tiff would be compelled to submit to a trial by jury. Whether
questions of constitutionality would arise if the statute should
provide that under no circumstances should a plea have the effect
of constituting a demand for a jury trial, or that participation in
the trial without a jury and without a demand therefor at the
inception of the trial should constitute a waiver or retraction of
any prior demand, would remain to be seen.
LEO CARLM.
lO upra n. 7.
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